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SUMMARY
Many in Congress and outside the govern-
ment have shown a growing interest in deploy-
ing a ballistic missile defense to protect the
United States from attack.  The 1972 ABM
Treaty prohibits nationwide defense but permits
the United States to deploy up to 100 intercep-
tors for long-range ballistic missiles at a single
site.  Many supporters of National Missile De-
fense (NMD) argue that the United States must
amend or abrogate this treaty so that it can
pursue a more robust defense.
The United States has pursued the devel-
opment and deployment of defenses against
long-range ballistic missiles since the early
1950s.  It deployed a treaty-compliant site in
North Dakota in the mid-1970s, but shut it
down after only a few months of operation.
President Reagan launched a research and
development effort into more extensive de-
fenses in the early 1980s, but these plans were
scaled back several times during the Reagan
and Bush Administrations.  
The Administration initially focused NMD
efforts on technology development, but, in
1996, outlined a strategy to pursue the develop-
ment and deployment of an NMD system by
2003 if the threat warranted and the technology
was ready.  In January 1999, the Administration
announced that it had adjusted this program to
permit deployment in 2005, and would decide
in Summer 2000 whether to proceed with
deployment of up to 20 at a single site. This
was apparently modified in February 2000 to
allow for 100 interceptors.
Many in Congress have disagreed with the
Administration’s approach arguing that the
threat justifies the more rapid deployment of an
NMD system.  Other analysts have argued that
the United States should modify a Navy theater
missile defense system so that it would have
the capability to defend against long-range
ballistic missiles.  Still others argue that the
United States should focus on arms control
and nonproliferation strategies, rather than
missile defenses, to counter the threats from
missile proliferation.
The Clinton Administration will review
several factors whether to proceed with the
deployment of an NMD system.  These include
an assessment of the threat to the United
States from long-range ballistic missiles, an
assessment of the maturity of the technology
and the feasibility of deploying an effective
system, consideration of the implications for
the ABM Treaty and the possibility of gaining
Russian agreement on amendments, the poten-
tial costs of the prospective system, and the
environmental implications of deployment.
Many in Congress have questioned the
Administration’s commitment to NMD fund-
ing and deployment.  Some have argued that
additional funds could speed the development
and deployment of the program.  And, in an
effort to press the Administration to deploy an
NMD, both the House and the Senate have




On September 1, 2000, President Clinton announced that he had decided not to
authorize deployment of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system at this time.  He stated
that he could not conclude “that we have enough confidence in the technology, and the
operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system, to move forward to deployment.”
Consequently, the planned deployment date of 2005 will slip, but research and development
will continue and the United States will continue to discuss this system and possible changes
to the ABM Treaty, with Russia.  The President further stated that the final decision on
deployment would be left to the next Administration.  This announcement ran counter to
expectations that the President would accept Secretary of Defense Cohen’s arguments in
favor of a “limited green light,” where the United States would begin the early phases of
construction at the radar facility on Shemya Island in Alaska.  Construction at that site
would have to begin in early 2001 to be completed by 2005.  But, the President reportedly
concluded that it would not be wise to begin construction there, and raise questions about
continued U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty, if the other technologies needed for the
system would not be ready by 2005 anyway. 
In late August, 2000, Philip Coyle, the Director of Operational Testing at the
Department of Defense, stated that the United States would not be able to deploy an NMD
system by the target date of 2005 because testing of the system’s components had fallen
behind schedule.  He contended that a more aggressive testing program would be needed to
achieve a deployment date of 2005.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Introduction
Many in Congress and outside government have shown a growing interest in recent years
in deploying a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system to protect the United States from
attack.  Several events in the last decade contributed to these evolving views.  The collapse
of the Soviet Union in 1991 heightened concerns about the possibility of an accidental or
unauthorized launch of ballistic missiles from the remnants of that nation. The Persian Gulf
War in 1991, with Iraq’s use of Scud missiles, alerted many to the growing threat posed by
ballistic missiles. The proliferation of ballistic missile technologies, including sales from
nations such as China, Russia, and North Korea to nations such as Iran, Syria, and Pakistan
became more worrisome. Finally, many recognized that some U.S. adversaries, such as North
Korea, were developing longer-range missiles that might reach targets in the United States.
Two events in the summer of 1998 served as a turning point in the debate over National
Missile Defense (NMD).  First, in July, a congressionally-mandated panel chaired by former
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld concluded that nations seeking to develop long-range
ballistic missiles might be able to achieve that objective within 5 years of deciding to do so,
and that the United States might have little warning before the testing and deployment of such
missiles.  This finding contrasted with official intelligence community assessments, first
articulated in 1995, which stated that the continental United States was not likely to face a
new ballistic missile threat for 10-15 years.  (The basic difference between the two reports
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was that the U.S. intelligence community was tasked to examine indigenous capability to
develop long-range ballistic missiles, and concluded that large-scale technology transfers to
these nations were not likely, while the Rumsfeld panel concluded that many of these nations
were transferring technologies among themselves and could, therefore, develop long-range
ballistic missiles in relatively shorter periods of time.)  Then, at the end of August, North
Korea flight tested a 3-stage ballistic missile.  Although the third stage of this missile
apparently failed in flight, and this missile would not have had the range to reach the
continental United States, North Korea demonstrated that it had developed the technology
for “staged” missiles, a milestone considered critical to the development of longer-range
ballistic missiles.  Many in the United States then concluded that North Korea could have a
missile with the range to reach U.S. territory, such as parts of Alaska, in a year or two, and
possibly, the rest of the United States, with a much smaller warhead, shortly thereafter.
Both the Clinton Administration and Congress reacted to these developments.  In
January 1999, the Administration announced that, for the first time, it had allocated funding
in its Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) for the deployment of an NMD system, even though
it would not decide whether to deploy such a system until Summer 2000.  And, in March
1999, Congress passed by a wide margin legislation declaring it the policy of the United
States to deploy an NMD.
This issue brief provides an overview of the current debate on NMD. It begins with a
brief summary of the provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty and a short history of U.S. NMD
efforts to provide a context for the current debate.  It then reviews approaches to NMD
development and deployment, describing the Administration’s current strategy and major
alternative views on how the United States should address missile threats to its territory.  The
Issue Brief then identifies and describes the factors that the Administration will consider when
making its decision about NMD deployment in Summer 2000, and tracks progress and
changes in each of these factors.  Finally, the Issue Brief summarizes current debate in
Congress about NMD, focusing on budget issues and legislation.
The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
The 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty prohibits the deployment of
ABM systems for the defense of the nations’ entire territory.  It permits each side to deploy
limited ABM systems at two locations, one centered on the nation’s capital and one at a
location containing ICBM silo launchers.  A 1974 Protocol further limited each nation to one
ABM site, located either at the nation’s capital or around an ICBM deployment area.  Each
ABM site can contain no more than 100 ABM launchers and 100 ABM interceptor missiles.
The Treaty also specifies that, in the future, any radars that provide early warning of strategic
ballistic missile attack must be located on the periphery of the national territory and oriented
outward.  The Treaty bans the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based,
space-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems and ABM system components (these include
interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars or other sensors that can substitute for radars).
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History of NMD in the United States
The Sentinel and Safeguard Programs
The United States has pursued research and development into anti-ballistic missile
(ABM) systems since the early 1950s.  In the mid-1960s it developed the Sentinel system,
which would have used ground-based, nuclear-armed interceptor missiles and would have
been deployed around a number of major urban areas to protect against Soviet attack.  Many
analysts recognized that such protection would be limited, in part because the Soviet Union
could probably saturate the system with offensive warheads and just a few warheads could
achieve massive damage against a “soft” target like a city.  In response,  supporters argued
that the system could provide a “thin” defense of U.S. cities against an attack by an
anticipated Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force.
In 1969, the Nixon Administration renamed the system “Safeguard,” and changed its
focus to deployment around offensive missile fields, rather than cities, to ensure that these
missiles could survive a first strike and retaliate against the Soviet Union.  Many in Congress
objected to the program, citing its costs, technical uncertainties, and the risk of accelerating
the arms race.  Congress almost stopped the program in 1969, when the Senate voted 50-50
to approve an amendment halting construction.  Safeguard continued, however, when Vice
President Agnew broke the tie with a vote for the program.  Nevertheless, sentiment against
ABM deployments and in favor of negotiated limits on ABM systems, was growing.
Negotiations with the Soviet Union on the ABM Treaty began in November 1969.  Early
in the negotiations the United States proposed that the treaty limit Russia to one site around
Moscow (which it was already building) and permit the United States to deploy four sites
around ICBM fields, which was the current U.S. program (construction had already begun
on a site near Grand Forks, ND).  The Soviets rejected this proposal, insisting that any
agreement include equal limits on each nation.  They had the same reaction when the United
States proposed that the treaty permit either nation to deploy one site at its capital or two
sites at ICBM fields.  Eventually, the Nixon Administration agreed to accept parity in ABM
deployments; each nation could deploy two sites, one around its capital and one around an
ICBM field.  This permitted the continued construction of each nation’s existing ABM site.
When it became clear that neither nation would complete a second site, the two sides agreed,
in a 1974 Protocol, that each would have only one ABM site under the Treaty.  The United
States completed its nuclear interceptor ABM site near Grand Forks.  It operated for 9
months in 1974 and 1975, then was shut down because it proved to be not cost-effective. The
facilities at that location, however, continue to count under the ABM Treaty because they
have not been completely dismantled according to a post-Treaty agreement reached with the
Soviet Union.  Russia continues to operate its ABM site around Moscow.  U.S. research and
development into ABM systems, especially for ICBM protection, continued, albeit at lower
budget levels through the late 1970s, before rising again during the Carter Administration.
The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
The Reagan Administration continued to increase funding for missile defenses of ICBMs.
In March 1983, President Reagan announced an expansive effort to develop non-nuclear
ballistic missile defenses that would protect the United States against a full-scale attack from
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the Soviet Union.  Although the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) remained a research and
development effort, with little testing and no immediate deployments, President Reagan and
the program’s supporters envisioned a large-scale defensive system with thousands of land-,
sea-, air-, and space-based sensors and interceptors.  This global defensive “shield” would
employ both non-nuclear interceptor missiles and more exotic laser or x-ray devices designed
to destroy incoming missiles.  With these technologies, the United States would replace
deterrence with defense in its effort to protect itself from Soviet attack.  However, as cost
estimates and technical challenges increased, the Reagan Administration scaled back its
objectives for SDI.  It announced that it would begin with a “Phase I” deployment of land-
based and space-based sensors and interceptors.  This system would not provide complete
protection from Soviet attack, but would, instead, disrupt the attack enough to call into
question the attack’s effectiveness.  Phase I of SDI would, therefore, according to their
arguments, enhance deterrence, while the United States continued to seek a way to replace
deterrence with defense. Although Congress largely supported BMD research and
development, it generally opposed plans for significant BMD deployments.
The Reagan Administration and the program’s supporters recognized that many of the
technologies pursued under SDI would not be allowed by the ABM Treaty when they entered
the testing or deployment phases.  Therefore, the Reagan Administration outlined a new
interpretation of the ABM Treaty that it hoped would allow for the testing of space-based and
exotic missile defense technologies.  Many in Congress objected to this re-interpretation of
the ABM Treaty, with Senator Sam Nunn mounting a particularly comprehensive defense of
the traditional interpretation of the Treaty. Throughout this period, Congress tendered strong
support for the ABM Treaty.  The Reagan Administration also opened new negotiations with
the Russians, known as the Defense and Space talks, in an effort to reach agreement on
modifications to or a replacement for the ABM Treaty.
Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS)
The Bush Administration responded to the costs and technical challenges of Phase I and
the changing international political environment with a further contraction of the goals for
SDI.  Instead of seeking to protect the United States against a large-scale attack, the United
States would seek to deploy a defensive system that could provide Global Protection Against
Limited Strikes (GPALS).  This recognized that the demise of the Soviet Union had reduced
the likelihood of a large-scale attack, but may have increased the likelihood of a small
accidental or unauthorized attack.  In addition, this type of ballistic missile defense would
have sought to protect the United States, its forces, and allies against an attack by other
nations who had acquired relatively small numbers of ballistic missiles.  
The Bush Administration envisioned a GPALS system that would have included up to
1,000 land-based interceptors and perhaps another 1,000 space-based interceptors, along with
space-based sensors.  The Administration recognized that this system would have exceeded
the limits in the ABM Treaty.  It, therefore, held negotiations with the Russian government
in 1992 in an effort to identify a more cooperative and flexible regime to replace the ABM
Treaty.  The Clinton Administration suspended these negotiations in 1993, when it also scaled
back U.S. objectives for a national missile defense program. Meanwhile, some in Congress,
notably Senator Nunn, had argued since the late 1980s for the deployment of a more limited




National Missile Defense (NMD) Technology Development Program
In FY1994, the Clinton Administration restructured the BMD programs to reflect the
results of the 1993 Bottom Up Review, a DOD-wide review of U.S. military plans and
programs.  At the time, it decided to emphasize TMD development and deployment efforts,
and to focus NMD on technology development.  Secretary of Defense Les Aspin noted that
these program changes reflected an assessment that the regional ballistic missile threat already
existed, while a ballistic missile threat to the United States per se might emerge only in the
future.  This raised questions about the need for an NMD system in the near- to mid-term,
particularly as compared with the need for robust TMD programs.  DOD also decided that
these programs would be conducted in compliance with the ABM Treaty.  These changes
allowed DOD to reduce the budget for BMD by $21 billion, from $39 billion planned by the
Bush Administration to $18 billion, over the course of the 1993-1999 FYDP.  Of this amount,
$3 billion was allocated to NMD.  The Clinton Administration continued to designate the
NMD portion of its BMD programs as technology development program until 1996, when
it adopted the 3+3 strategy for NMD.  This strategy, and the modifications announced in
January 1999, are described in the next section.
Approaches to NMD
Current Clinton Administration Program
In 1996, the Clinton Administration adopted a new policy, the 3+3 strategy, to guide
NMD development and potential deployment.  Under this strategy, the United States would
develop an NMD system that would be designed to defend the United States against attacks
from small numbers of long-range ballistic missiles launched by hostile nations, or, perhaps,
from an accidental or unauthorized launch of Russian or Chinese missiles. The 3+3 strategy
envisioned continued development of NMD technologies during the first 3 years (1997-2000),
followed by a deployment decision (in 2000) if the system were technologically feasible and
warranted by prospective threats. If a decision to deploy an NMD system were made, the plan
then was to deploy it within the second three year period (2000-2003). Development and
deployment was to be conducted within the limits of the ABM Treaty.
This 3+3 strategy was modified in January 1999. At that time, the Administration added
$6.6 billion for NMD to the FY1999-2005 FYDP. (This was an additional amount over what
had been planned for that period only the year before.) This amount included $600 million
that Congress added for missile defense in the FY1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L.
105-277), and brought total NMD funding for the FYDP to $10.5 billion. The Administration
emphasized that an NMD deployment decision still would not be made until Summer 2000,
but that now there was money in the FYDP to protect and pursue the deployment option in
the event a deployment decision was made. In addition, the Administration announced that
it had restructured the NMD program for a possible deployment date of 2005, rather than
2003. Some referred to this as the 3+5 strategy. This change was made, according to the
Pentagon, to reduce the amount of risk in the program and to maximize its success.
On September 1, 2000, President Clinton announced that he would not approve
deployment of an NMD system at this time because he was not convinced that the technology
would prove feasible.  Two intercept tests had failed and development and testing of system
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components had fallen behind schedule.  As a result, the target deployment date of 2005
would slip by a year or two.
In February 2000, the President submitted his budget request to Congress asking for
$1.9 billion for NMD for FY 01. The request includes some $175 million for military
construction and procurement of long-lead items to support an NMD deployment decision
later this summer. The new budget allows for deployment of 100 ground-based interceptors,
rather than the 20 originally proposed. The budget request also includes an additional $2.2
billion over the FYDP for NMD, bringing it to about $10.4 billion.
Program Design and Architecture.  The Clinton Administration granted a contract to
Boeing North America to serve as the “lead system integrator” for the NMD program.
Boeing serves as the prime contractor, and will integrate elements of the program developed
by different companies into an NMD system.  Boeing also will execute the test program that
will lead to the integrated system tests in 2000 and 2001.  (Boeing has contracted to provide
20 GBIs for deployment, as well as five spares. It must also build another 14 missiles for flight
tests prior to deployment, and another 36 for follow-on test and evaluation flights.) 
Until this year, BMDO described 3 notional architectures: C1 (Capability 1); C2; and C3.
The C1 architecture might deploy up to 20 interceptors at one site to defend against a very
limited threat, such as a small-scale accidental or unauthorized launch, or a small-scale
deliberate attack. The President’s September 2000 decision against deployment would delay
this initial system by a year or two. In the future, a C2 architecture might feature up to 100
interceptors to defend against a larger threat, while the C3 architecture envisions 100-200
interceptors deployed at 1 or more sites to defend against a much larger and more
sophisticated threat. Currently, the FYDP provides funding for 100 interceptors and the
support sensor and weapon infrastructure. This new architecture has been called C-1 Prime.
At the present time, the prospective  NMD system architecture consists of: 1) the
Ground-Based Interceptor, which includes a booster rocket,  kill vehicle, and ground-based
command and launch equipment; 2) a Ground Based Radar that will perform acquisition,
tracking, discrimination, and kill-assessment functions; 3) the Battle Management, Command,
Control, and Communications system that will be used to identify and assess attacks and
authorize the launch of interceptor missiles; 4) and space-based sensors for early warning of
attack (i.e., Defense Support Program/Space Based Infrared System and the Space and
Missile Tracking System/Space Based Infrared System Low Earth Orbit). Other candidate
sensors include Upgraded Early Warning Radars, which will provide enhanced capability for
the United States to detect and track missile launches, as well as other radars. 
Congressional Reaction to Administration Program
Many in Congress have disagreed with the Clinton Administration’s NMD strategy.
Some have argued that the threat from uncertainties in Russia and missiles in rogue nations
exists now.  Some also argued that the United States may have too little warning to respond
to emerging threats with the deployment of a missile defense system.  And some have argued
that the Clinton Administration has placed the ABM Treaty above U.S. national security,
maintaining it at all costs in spite of the demise of the Soviet Union.  And many are still
particularly concerned about the Administration’s refusal to commit to deploy an NMD
system immediately. Conversely, some, including Senator Biden, have argued that the new
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NMD strategy represents a turning away from long-term U.S. arms control objectives and
nonproliferation policy.
After the Administration altered its NMD program in January 1999, some Members
praised the Administration for adding deployment funds to the budget.  Senator Jon Kyl
stated, “I’m delighted.  I think reality finally caught up with them.” But some continued to
question the Administration’s commitment to NMD and they expressed concerns about the
delay in the deployment date. For example, Representative Curt Weldon said he remained
skeptical because the program still lacked a firm commitment to deployment and Senator
Robert Smith noted that he did not see a commitment to deployment that matched the
rhetoric from the Administration.  Nevertheless, in the report that accompanied the Senate
Armed Services Committee’s version of the FY2000 Defense Authorization Bill (S.1059), the
committee praised the Administration for fully funding the development and deployment of
an NMD system.
A few Members of Congress have argued previously that the Administration’s approach
to NMD would have provided too little protection against the range of threats faced by the
United States.  Some would like to see a program that includes space-based sensors and
interceptors.  Others believe a sea-based NMD can provide more robust coverage sooner and
for less money than the Administration’s program (this concept is discussed below).  And
some Members believe that the United States should continue to pursue the development of
a missile defense that can protect the United States from a large-scale attack by Russia.  They
note that Russian missiles still threaten the United States, and changes in Russian leadership
could restore the adversarial relationship between the two nations. 
Despite the most recent failed test in July 2000, congressional sentiment appeared to
support efforts to continue keeping the program on track and pushing forward with a summer
2000 deployment decision.  However, a growing number of Members had argued that the
President should delay the decision until the next Administration.  When the President
announced such a delay on September 1, 2000, many Members praised his move.  Most
Democrats and some Republicans appeared to agree that the technology had not yet proved
to be feasible and that further testing should be completed before a final deployment decision.
Some Republicans, however, viewed the President’s announcement as further evidence that
the Clinton Administration was not serious about missile defense and had done little to protect
the American public.  Senator Trent Lott referred to the decision as “another example of the
Clinton-Gore Administration’s legacy of missed opportunities. Representative Curt Weldon
stated that the President’s “misguided decision” would leave Americans “completely
unprotected against the weapon of choice for rogue nations and terrorist groups – the
missile.”
Sea-Based NMD
Some NMD supporters, and increasingly senior Navy military leaders, have advocated
an alternative sea-based NMD program. The Heritage Foundation, for instance, examined
current and future ballistic missile threats in 1995 and 1996 and  proposed a sea-based NMD
to meet these threats. The Foundation’s most recent (March 1999) report, Defending
America: A Plan to Meet the Urgent Missile Threat, outlined a plan “to achieve the most cost
effective, most affordable global anti-missile protection in the shortest time.” The plan,
supported by other conservatives as well, calls for deploying an NMD system based aboard
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the U.S. Navy’s Aegis ships. Currently, the United States has about 27 Aegis cruisers and
about 26 Aegis destroyers (by about 2008, there will be 57 destroyers). 
There was some movement in 1999 on this issue. In the report that accompanied the
Senate Armed Services Committee’s version of the FY2000 Defense Authorization Bill
(S.1059), the Committee called on the Secretary of Defense to prepare a new report
evaluating options for supplementing a land-based NMD architecture with sea-based assets.
It mandated that the report address the engineering steps that would be needed to develop a
sea-based NMD system and that it evaluate requirements, performance benefits, design trade-
offs, operational impacts, and refined cost estimates for sea-based NMD assets.  Meanwhile,
the Navy has proceeded to examine more closely some of the many technical and cost
hurdles.
Boost-Phase NMD
By mid-2000, a growing number of analysts and critics of the Administration’s NMD
program, from across the political spectrum, had begun to argue that the United States should
pursue boost-phase, rather than mid-course ballistic missile defenses.  A boost-phase defense
would attack an enemy’s missiles early in flight, before they had left the atmosphere and
before they had time to deploy multiple warheads or decoys.  The interceptors could be
deployed at sea, on land, or in space, as long as they were close enough to intercept an
enemy’s missiles within the first few minutes of its launch.  Some critics, such as Richard
Garwin, argued that this type of defense would be the only way to protect the United States
against missile attack because a land-based, mid-course NMD would not be able to
distinguish between decoys and actual warheads.  Others, including the Republican nominee,
Governor George Bush, have argued that the United States should pursue boost-phase
defenses as a part of a more robust system, because they would give the United States
multiple opportunities to intercept attacking missiles. 
Officials in Russia have also argued for the development of boost-phase defenses.  In
early June, President Putin proposed that the United States and Russia cooperate on the
development of boost-phase defenses that could “put a cap” on rogue nations and their
missiles.  He also proposed that Russia share its technology for these missiles with nations in
Europe.  He stated that this type of defense would not violate the ABM Treaty because it
could be directed against theater-range ballistic missiles.  The Clinton Administration remains
skeptical of the Russian proposal because it still lacks details.  Furthermore, the
Administration has argued that this would not replace the U.S. NMD program because it
could not protect against long-range strategic ballistic missiles.
The Clinton Administration has not denied the potential for boost-phase defenses for
NMD, but it has noted that the technologies for this type of system are not as advanced as the
technologies for mid-course defenses, and that the United States would not be able to deploy
such defenses until years after the current 2005 goal for NMD deployment.  Furthermore,
some critics have argued that, because the defenses would have to respond instantaneously
to the launch of an enemy missile, the United States would have to trust computers, rather
than human beings, to interpret events and initiate a conflict.
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Focus on Arms Control and Nonproliferation Strategies
Some Members of Congress and analysts outside government argue that the United
States does not need a national missile defense to address the threat of missile attack from
rogue nations.  Some believe that the United States will not be able to develop and deploy a
cost-effective NMD because of daunting technical challenges and certain high costs that
would be associated with such a complex system.  Others argue that rogue nations with
weapons of mass destruction could attack the United States with lower cost, and less obvious,
means than ballistic missiles.  They note that a BMD system would do nothing to stop cargo
ships or other unconventional or simpler means of delivery.  Some also argue that a U.S.
NMD could actually intensify missile threats to the United States if Russia slows or stops its
offensive force reductions in response to U.S. proposals for changes in the ABM Treaty.
They note that the strategic arms reduction treaties will eliminate thousands of warheads that
could destroy the United States, while an NMD would only attempt to defend against a few
dozen warheads.
Most critics of proposals to deploy an NMD do not dispute that some nations hostile to
the United States may be seeking long-range ballistic missiles.  They would, however, address
these threats with a combination of diplomatic, arms control, and nonproliferation tools.
They believe that economic, political, and military incentives, could help persuade nations not
to pursue missile technologies or sell them to countries of concern.  And they argue that a
strong international nonproliferation regime could bring more pressure to bear on rogue
nations than a U.S. NMD.  And if cooperative methods are less than successful, many note
that the United States could still deter missile attacks from rogue nations with its
overwhelming military superiority in  nuclear and conventional forces. They believe that no
nation, even one led by a leader with less-than-rational objectives, would risk attacking the
United States if it believed that its own survival would be threatened in response.
Factors Affecting an NMD Deployment Decision
Generally, the Administration identifies four broad criteria to consider in its Deployment
Readiness Review: an assessment of the threat, an assessment of the arms control and
strategic environment, a technical assessment of the program, and an assessment of the cost
of the NMD system. Additionally, however, an environmental impact assessment is being
prepared. These are discussed further below.
Threat Assessment
In 1995, Intelligence Community concluded in its November 1995 report, Emerging
Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years, NIE 95-19, that “no country,
other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic
missile in the next 15 years that threaten the contiguous 48 states.”  Some Members of
Congress disputed this finding, noting that it did not address threats to Alaska and Hawaii,
and did not consider the possibility that nations might accelerate missile programs by buying
technologies, or full missile systems, from other nations. Some in Congress argued that the
Administration had directed the report’s findings to support the slow pace of its NMD
program.  Congress mandated that an independent panel review the underlying assumptions
and conclusions of NIE 95-19.  This panel, known as the Gates Commission, noted that the
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study may have been conducted in haste and that its conclusions were politically naive
because they did not examine the entire range of issues associated with foreign missile
developments.  However, it concluded that the study had not been politicized with a result
directed by the White House.
In 1997, the intelligence community reaffirmed that the United States would not face a
new long-range missile threat for 10-15 years.  Members of Congress, however, continued
to question this conclusion, and in the FY1997 Defense Authorization Act, Congress
mandated that the CIA appoint an independent panel to review the emerging missile threat
to the United States.  In July 1998, this panel, chaired by former Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, reported that a threat to the United States could emerge sooner than 2010, and that
countries such as North Korea or Iran might have long-range missiles within 5 years of
deciding to develop such systems.  In January 1999, the Clinton Administration appeared to
accept the Rumsfeld Commission’s conclusions.  Secretary Cohen noted that “there is a
threat, and the threat is growing, and... it will soon pose a danger... to Americans here at
home.”  He highlighted North Korea as a potential source of this threat. 
At around the same time, the intelligence community appeared to alter its assessment of
the threat from North Korea.  In late 1998, Robert Walpole, the National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic and Nuclear Programs spoke about the results of an assessment completed in
October 1998.  This study concluded that North Korea’s Taepo Dong II missile, which is still
under development, might have the range needed to reach most of the United States, albeit
with an inaccurate and very light payload.  And, in testimony before Congress in late February
1999, General Lester Lyles, the director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, stated
that North Korea might acquire that capability by the year 2000.  The Director of Central
Intelligence, George Tenet, also noted in testimony in February that North Korea’s Taepo
Dong II missile might have the capability to reach Alaska and Hawaii with a larger warhead
and the rest of the United States with a smaller, inaccurate warhead.
In early September 1999, the intelligence community released a new estimate of the
projected ballistic missile threat to the United States.  This report indicates that Russia, China,
and North Korea are all likely to have ICBMs that can reach U.S. territory in the next 15
years, that Iran probably will have such a capability, and Iraq possibly may have that
capability.  The report indicated that Russia will have the most robust force, but, because of
economic constraints, its force levels are likely to decline below the levels permitted by
existing arms control agreements.  China may also have tens of missiles armed with nuclear
warheads that could target the United States, and that the Chinese threat would, in part, be
influenced by technology gained through espionage.  The report also stated that North Korea
might test its Taepo-Dong II missile at any time, and that this missile could have the capability
to deliver an early-generation nuclear weapon to U.S. territory.  The Taepo-Dong I missile,
which was tested in August 1998, might also reach U.S. territory, but only with a lighter
chemical or biological weapons payload, and with significant inaccuracies.
Technical Feasibility
The meaning of technical feasibility as a criteria for deployment has been relatively open
to interpretation. In the NMD debate, it generally carries two meanings. First, there is a
political connotation. Many in Congress and elsewhere who want an NMD system deployed
as soon as technologically possible tend to believe that this criteria would be met as soon as
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the United States develops and tests all the components of a prospective system.  This
generally means that when a system can be built, it should be built.  A second meaning of
technical feasibility refers to specific criteria established within the Defense Department in
order for a weapon system to proceed toward deployment. Until recently, these included a
number of precise and technical criteria to be achieved within the program before a positive
recommendation for NMD deployment could be made to the White House.  
The NMD program office in the Pentagon has stated that two successful test intercepts
will be required to move the program forward. Site construction contracts can be awarded
after one successful intercept, but two successes must be achieved before actual site
construction can begin. Additionally, a new NMD milestone was established called the “site
authority to proceed.” This requires that the Secretary of Defense authorize the start of site
construction in April 2001 based on the decisions the United States has made regarding the
ABM Treaty. (A decision at this time is necessary to meet the scheduled 2005 NMD fielding
date.)  Last year, the number of flight tests that could occur before the Deployment Readiness
Review (DRR) was reduced from four to three. The pace of the program has caused senior
technical experts in and outside of the Pentagon to warn that significant program risk exists,
which could lead to negative program developments down the road. They warn that the
program is being schedule, rather than event driven.
Recent intercept attempts confirm that unambiguous success remains elusive. On
October 2, 1999, BMDO reported it had successfully intercepted an intercontinental ballistic
missile over the Pacific Ocean. Reportedly, the test demonstrated the “hit-to-kill” technology
being pursued in the current NMD program.  But, reports of test anomalies surfaced in Jan.
2000, which DoD officials confirmed were true, but who argued nonetheless that the kill
vehicle “worked in spite of that.”  On January 18, 2000, a second test failed to destroy its
target over the Pacific Ocean as planned. Defense officials pointed out, however, that other
test objectives such as system integration were achieved. Preliminary analyses suggested that
the two infrared sensors on the kill vehicle failed in the last seconds of the test, causing it to
miss the target. Then, on July 7, 2000, the kill vehicle failed to separate from the booster
rocket, so the test of its capabilities never occurred.
In February 2000, additional criticism of the NMD program surfaced from within the
Pentagon’s Operational Test & Evaluation directorate, warning of undo pressure placed on
the NMD program to meet an artificial decision point in the development process later this
summer. This echoed similar criticism from a November 1999 Pentagon sponsored panel of
technical and national security experts (the Welch panel).  Some critics outside the
government have focussed on the system’s ability to discriminate between warheads and
decoys on an attacking missile. They note that adversaries are likely to deploy decoys in an
effort to defeat the system, and, therefore, the system will be ineffective as soon as it is
deployed.  Some conclude that this weakness means the United States should not proceed
with the development and deployment of NMD; others conclude that the United States should
pursue more robust and advanced NMD technologies, including advanced space-based
sensors and boost-phase interceptors.
In July 2000, a growing number of analysts and Members of Congress called on the
Administration to delay its decision about NMD deployment.  Some argued that the
technology had not been proven feasible; others wanted the decision to be made by the new
President in January 2001.  By late July and early August, reports indicated that Secretary of
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Defense Cohen was likely to advise the President to proceed with early steps in the
contracting process for the construction of the X-band radar in Alaska.  This construction
would have to begin by Spring 2001 to support a 2005 deployment date.  But the process
could be stopped, before construction began, if the next President decided to pursue a
different path on NMD.  However, President Clinton did not accept this recommendation,
and, when he announced that he would not authorize deployment of an NMD system, he cited
the test failures and questions about technical feasibility as his primary concerns.
Arms Control & Strategic Environment
In his press conference in January, 1999, Secretary of Defense Cohen stated that NMD
deployment “might require modifications to the [ABM] Treaty and the Administration is
working to determine the nature and scope of these modifications.”  In September 1999, the
Administration announced that it was prepared to seek these changes in two phases. In the
first phase, the Administration will seek an amendment permitting the United States to deploy
its single, permitted ABM site in Alaska, rather than North Dakota.  Many believe that this
site is better suited to a defense against emerging rogue nation threats.  In addition, by
limiting the negotiations to a single issue, the Administration hoped to convince Russia that
the United States really did seek a limited NMD, and not one that could counter Russian
nuclear forces.  In the second phase, the United States would seek amendments that would
permit the deployment of two or more sites, and the use of more advanced radars and space-
based sensors.  Some in Congress have criticized this approach, arguing that the United States
should enter the negotiations seeking all the changes it would need to deploy an NMD, and
that the United States should be prepared to withdraw from the treaty if Russia does not
agree.  Others argue that the approach will fail because Russia is not likely to agree to even
a simple change that would permit the United States to deploy an NMD in Alaska.
In late February 1999, a U.S. team, led by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, met
with Russian officials in Moscow to begin discussions about ABM Treaty modifications.  The
U.S. team sought to reassure Russia that the planned NMD would not interfere with Russia’s
strategic nuclear forces and that the United States still views the ABM Treaty as central to
the U.S.-Russian strategic balance.  The Russians were reportedly unconvinced, and
continued to argue that the United States has overstated the threat from rogue nations so that
it can build a defense that will be able to intercept Russian missiles.  At their meeting during
the G-8 summit in Germany in June, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that the
negotiations would resume in late summer 1999.  In addition, in contrast to the views that
Russian officials had expressed in the preceding months, President Yeltsin appeared to agree
that the Treaty could be amended to accommodate U.S. concerns about defending against
rogue nation missile threats.
When discussions resumed in mid-August 1999, the two sides again reaffirmed that the
Treaty is the “cornerstone of strategic stability,” but Russian officials continued to reject the
idea that the treaty could be amended and argued that any changes to the treaty would upset
strategic stability and undermine Russia’s national security.  Col. General Leonid Ivashov,
from the Defense Ministry, reportedly called the talks a failure and said that U.S. insistence
on modifying the ABM Treaty was undermining the offensive arms control process.  After
further discussions in September 1999, the Russian Foreign Ministry released a statement
saying that Moscow will insist on “strict observance” of previous arms control agreements.
The talks continued in early October, with little progress reported.  However, in mid-October,
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U.S. press reports and Administration statements indicated that the United States had offered
to help Russia complete construction of an early warning radar in Siberia and to expand its
cooperation with Russia on the sharing of early warning data.  These gestures are reportedly
a part of the U.S. effort to convince Russia to modify the ABM treaty so that the United
States can deploy an NMD system in Alaska.  In November, President Yeltsin warned that
any U.S. attempt to move beyond the existing limits in the ABM Treaty would “have
extremely negative consequences” for other arms control treaties.  Russian officials also
stated that Russia was prepared to deploy new multiple-warhead missiles or retain older ones
so that it would have forces to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. Many Russian officials
continued to insist that the United States had overstated the threat from rogue nations.
Secretary of State Albright reported a slight change in Russia's response to U.S.
proposals after meetings in Moscow in  early February 2000.  Although the Minister of
Defense continued to state that major changes to the treaty were unnecessary, the Secretary
of State stated that President Putin remained open to discussing possible changes that would
allow the deployment of a limited NMD system.  However, Russian officials once again
rejected the possibility of amendments to the ABM Treaty after discussions in late February
and early March, 2000. In June 2000, Defense Minister Sergeyev repeated Russia’s
contention that the U.S. NMD system could be easily expanded and, therefore would
undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent.  He argued that the United States would use its NMD
system along with its offensive forces to achieve superiority over Russia and China.
When the Russian parliament approved ratification of the START II Treaty in April
2000, it indicated that U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty could be considered an
extraordinary event that would lead to Russia’s withdrawal from START II.  Some analysts
believe Russia has linked START II with the ABM Treaty is designed to slow the U.S. move
towards deployment of an NMD.  They believe that Russia might have concluded that the
pressure to modify or withdraw from the ABM Treaty would diminish if U.S. officials and
Members of Congress realized that such a move would undermine a popular treaty – START
II, – as well as the less popular ABM Treaty.  However, Russia may have underestimated the
strength of opposition to continued adherence to the ABM Treaty in Congress.  For example,
several U.S. Senators object to current U.S.-Russian discussions on the ABM Treaty  because
the United States is seeking only modest changes to the treaty to permit the deployment of
a limited NMD system.  Twenty-five Senators signed a letter to the President that indicated
that such changes would be insufficient because they would preclude the U.S. deployment of
more extensive NMD technologies, such as sea-based and space-based systems.  In addition,
Senator Helms, who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has stated that he would
not bring up for consideration any arms control agreement reached during the last few months
of the Clinton Administration.  Consequently, it is possible that, even if the United States and
Russia were to reach an agreement on ABM Treaty modifications, the changes would not
receive the necessary advice and consent to ratification in the U.S. Senate.
Presidents Clinton and Putin discussed ABM Treaty issues at their summit meeting in
Moscow in June 2000.  However, they made little progress on resolving their differences.  In
a Joint Statement on the Principles of Strategic Stability, they agreed that the ABM Treaty
remains the “cornerstone of strategic stability,” but that it could be modified in response to
changes in the international security environment.  They also agreed that the international
community faces a growing threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but
Russia did not agree that this justified any change in the ABM Treaty.  Russian officials
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continue to question U.S. assertions that North Korea and other nations could soon pose a
ballistic missile threat to the United States.
President Clinton sited the continuing impasse with Russia on ABM Treaty modifications
when he announced that he would not proceed with NMD deployment at the present time.
A delay in the start of construction at Shemya Island would, according to the President, give
te United States more time to pursue discussions with Russia in an effort to “narrow our
differences” on the nature of threat and the U.S. interest in NMD.
In addition to considering the arms control objectives of the United States, an
assessment is being made regarding relations with NATO allies, Russia, and the PRC. Within
these countries there is little enthusiasm for the United States deploying an NMD system, and
in some cases (including NATO countries), there are strong negative reactions. President
Clinton also acknowledged the opposition from U.S. allies when he announced his decision
not to proceed with NMD deployment.  He noted that a U.S. decision to proceed with NMD
deployment must have allied support because key components of the system would be on
their territories.
Budget Issues
There has never been a constant, consensus cost figure for deploying an NMD system.
For several years, the Clinton Administration estimated that a limited NMD system would
cost $9 to $11 billion to develop, test, and deploy. In January 1999, the Administration
estimated that an initial system of 20 interceptors would cost about $10.6 billion. In February
2000, the Administration provided a life-cycle cost estimate of $26.6 billion for an initial
system of 100 ground-based interceptors, presumably in Alaska. A couple of months later,
the Pentagon provided a life-cycle estimate of $30.2 billion for the NMD system ($FY1991).
By May 2000, the General Accounting Office reported a cost figure of $36.2 billion
(GAO/NSIAD-00-131), which number BMDO also apparently was using.  As time passes,
these figures are likely to change further.
A late April 2000 study by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that it
would cost about $29.5  billion to develop, build, and operate an initial NMD system (the
expanded Capability 1 system) through 2015. This total cost was comparable to the
Administration’s estimate of $30.2 billion (now apparently $36.2 billion).  CBO  estimates it
will cost another $19 billion through 2015 to expand the initial system of 100 interceptors and
build what is called a Capability 2 and Capability 3 system designed for greater numbers of
more sophisticated potential missile threats. Additional space-based sensors would bring the
total costs for NMD to around $60 billion through 2015.  NMD critics argue that the true
costs will be even higher, perhaps as much as $120 billion, to include other items some NMD
supporters want: space-based and naval-based NMD interceptors.    
Environmental Issues
In November 1998, the Administration filed a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register
that BMDO would begin to hold public scoping hearings in conjunction with its plan to
conduct an environmental impact analysis of potential locations for elements of an NMD
system (Federal Register 63915-16). Thus far, these locations include only Alaska and North
Dakota, with Alaska being chosen for the first phase. Although this does not mean a decision
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has been made to deploy an NMD system, it is yet another indicator that serious consideration
is being given to where such a system and its elements might be located.
The purpose of the public scoping hearings is to gather information from interested
parties regarding specific environmental concerns. This input will be considered in a draft
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which will be published sometime in 1999. More
public meetings will be held prior to the final EIS in the spring of 2000. At that time, the
Pentagon will announce which NMD basing locations will be considered. Environmental
concerns that might be raised in the next year or two over deploying an NMD system in North
Dakota, or especially in Alaska in and around National Park lands, could have a significant
affect on the calculus to deploy an NMD system in Summer 2000.
In late September 1999, a draft EIS was reported to include language for a possible two-
site deployment of NMD interceptors—Alaska and North Dakota. It suggested that up to 100
interceptor silos could be located in one location or up to 100 could be deployed in both one
site in Alaska or North Dakota. This appears to represent a change from the original focus
on one NMD site. Both sites still are being considered, but the Administration has not made
any firm commitment. Congress has called on the Administration to continue to examine the
merits of a two-site system before finalizing a decision next year.
NMD in Congress
Budget Issues
Despite the addition of $6.6 billion to last year’s FYDP for NMD deployment, some
continued to express doubts about the Administration’s commitment to NMD funding and
deployment.  Some NMD supporters argued that an NMD system could be deployed earlier
than 2005 if the Administration allocated more money to development and testing in the near-
term.  But the program managers in DOD and BMDO believed little more could be done
without introducing significant risk into the program. Time and engineering effort, not more
money, will lead to effective NMD development as soon as possible, according to this view.
This year, an additional $2.2 billion was added to the FYDP for NMD. Some of the earlier
criticisms of the Administration’s support for NMD might be softening.
Legislative Debate
Although many in Congress have disagreed with the Administration’s plans for NMD,
they had not been able to enact legislation that would mandate the deployment of nationwide
ballistic missile defenses until March 1999.  President Clinton vetoed the Defense
Authorization Bill for FY1996, in part, because it contained such a mandate.  In 1996 and
1997 Congress considered, but failed to pass, independent legislation that would mandate the
deployment of an NMD system.  On April 21, 1998, the  Senate Armed Services Committee
approved the American Missile Protection Act of 1998 (S. 1873, S.Rept. 105-175).  This
legislation called for the deployment of a national missile defense system as soon as the
technology was ready.  When the bill came to the floor in May 1998, Democrats succeeded
with a filibuster.  The effort to invoke cloture failed by one vote, 59 to 41, with only 4
Democrats joining all 55 Republicans in support of the legislation.  The Senate failed, again,
to invoke cloture, in a vote held on September 9, 1998.  Once again, the vote was 59-41. 
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Senator Cochran introduced this bill again in January 1999 (S. 257).  After failing to win
changes in the language, the Administration reportedly threatened to veto the legislation
because it would only use the state of technology as the measure for deployment, and would
ignore considerations about cost, threat, and treaty-compliance.  Nevertheless, the Senate
Armed Services Committee approved the legislation, by a vote of 11-7, on February 9, 1999.
The full Senate approved the bill, by a vote of 97-3, on March 17, 1999.   Democrats dropped
their opposition to the Senate bill, and the White House withdrew its threat of a veto, after
the Senate approved an amendment stating that it is U.S. policy to continue to negotiate with
Russia on reductions in offensive nuclear weapons and an amendment noting that NMD
programs remained subject to annual authorization and appropriations for funding.
Representative Curt Weldon  introduced similar legislation in the House on August 5,
1998 (H.R. 4402) and, again, in early February 1999 (H.R. 4).   This legislation simply states
that it is “the policy of the United States to deploy a National Missile Defense.”  Although it
does not specify when or how much missile defense the United States should deploy,
supporters argue that would produce a major change in U.S. policy because current
Administration policy supports development but leaves a deployment decision for the future.
This legislation passed the House Armed Services Committee, by a vote of 50-3, on February
25, 1999, and the full House, by a vote of 317-105, on March 18, 1999. 
The Senate took up H.R. 4 on May 18, 1999.  It struck all but the enacting clause with
the language of S. 257, then approved the modified bill by unanimous consent.  The House
debated the new version of H.R. 4 on May 20, 1999, and approved the bill with the Senate
language by a vote of  345-71.  Congress sent the legislation to the President on July 12,
1999, and the President signed in on July 23.  Some Members of Congress have been angered
by the Administration’s interpretation of the legislation.  They note that Administration is not
prepared to implement the law because it still plans on deciding whether to proceed with
NMD deployment after the program review in Summer 2000.  Members, including
Representative Weldon, argue that the legislation has eliminated the need for this decision by
indicating that the United States will proceed with deployment as soon as the technology is
ready.  Yet, in  a statement issued when he signed the law, President Clinton noted that “by
specifying that any NMD deployment must be subject to the authorization and appropriation
process, the legislation makes it clear that no decision on deployment had been made.”  The
Administration still plans to make its deployment decision in Summer 2000, following a
review of the threat, the status of the technology, costs, and arms control issues.
LEGISLATION
S. 2549 (Warner)
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.  Authorizes appropriations
for FY2001 for military activities of Department of Defense, for military construction, and
for defense activities of Department of Energy, and contains provisions for other purposes.
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